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Improving Governmental Transparency in Korea:
Toward Institutionalized and ICT-Enabled Transparency*
Seok-Jin Eom**
Abstract: The main purpose of this study is to examine how governmental
transparency has improved in Korea. To this end, the author examines the periodic
characteristics of governmental transparency while also analyzing the information
that each administration in Korea has produced. Also investigated are institutional
arrangements for accessing this information and the adoption of ICTs in government.
It was not until the democratic transition of 1987 that the transparency of the
government began to improve in Korea. The key characteristic of the transparency
policy after democratization was the pursuit of the simultaneous progress of
institutionalized and ICT-enabled governmental transparency. Citizens’ accessibility
to and the disclosure of public information were institutionalized. Furthermore,
ICTs enable citizens to access such information more efficiently through non-
stop operations and one-click services. In the course of establishing the institutions
to improve governmental transparency, however, executive dominance and
bureaucrats’ resistance to governmental transparency were the major challenges.
Keywords: transparency, governmental transparency in Korea, institutionalization,
e-government, democratization
INTRODUCTION
Transparency has become a widespread nostrum of ‘good governance’ in many
different contexts today. Not only in developing countries but also in developed countries,
transparency has emerged as a significant concept in the public sector and is regarded
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as a fundamental value for realizing other administrative values, including integrity,
fairness, accountability, and anti-corruption (Mudacumura, 2014; Kosack and Fung,
2014; Meijer, 2012; Hollyer et al. 2011; Hood and Heald, 2006; Armstrong, 2005;
Stiglitz, 2003; Park, 2001).
More specifically, emerging issues with regard to transparency with an emphasis
on the context of developing countries include the following. First, the institutionaliza-
tion of enhancing governmental transparency should be examined. It has been argued
that developing countries suffer from a weak institutional capacity when it comes to
overseeing integrity and transparency (Lowry, 2013; Armstrong, 2005). This weakness
leads to a low level of compliance/enforcement of policy measures to improve trans-
parency (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999). Therefore, issues pertaining to the creation
of stronger institutional arrangements to increase transparency should be addressed.
Second, the adoption of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to
increase governmental transparency should be examined. It is believed that the adoption
of ICTs is one of the most effective ways to disseminate government information and
to create a more transparent government in the digital age (Bertot et al., 2010; Meijer,
2009). Therefore, a strategy and process for ICTs adoption to realize the potential to
improve transparency should be considered.
Finally, various macro- and micro-factors which influence improvements to trans-
parency should be examined given the historical background and the characteristics of
public administration systems in developing countries (Jung et al., 2012; Meijer,
2012). It is natural that we should understand what factors can influence transparency
when designing effective policies to improve governmental transparency. In finding
the causal relationships between governmental transparency and its possible influential
factors, we should consider the various contextual factors in each country. For example,
it has been indicated that a colonial legacy and experiences related to a dictatorship in
the developing countries explain in part the concentration of power in the state and the
unfettered discretion of public officials, which are major obstacles preventing an
improvement of governmental transparency (Al-Jurf, 1999). Given these contextual
factors specific to developing countries, more fundamental issues of determining 
the major agents to overcome these obstacles within the public sector in developing
countries should be approached.
In this respect, Korea can be considered as a good benchmark in examining how
governmental transparency can be enhanced in the context of the developing coun-
tries. Governmental transparency has rapidly improved in Korea since the democratic
transition in 1987. Various institutionalizations to improve governmental transparency,
including the Official Information Disclosure Act, a Korean version of the Freedom of
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Information (FOI) Act, contributed significantly toward enhanced transparency (Jung
et al., 2012; Yoon, 2010; Jang and Song, 2008;; Park, 2001). In addition, various e-
government systems and government initiatives for the digitalization of government
have been devised to increase not only efficiency but also transparency in government
(Song, 2004). Furthermore, active civic participation based on democratization has
functioned as a political driver to overcome obstacles preventing improved governmental
transparency while also working to speed up the enactment of laws and regulations
related to governmental transparency. Despite these efforts and their achievements 
to some extent, the level of governmental transparency has not been evaluated as 
satisfactory. The author believes that these types of experiences in Korea for improving
governmental transparency can give good lessons and provide important policy impli-
cations for many developing countries.
In this vein, the main purpose of this study is to examine how governmental trans-
parency has improved in Korea. More specifically, the author examines the periodic
characteristics of governmental transparency while also analyzing the information that
each administration in Korea has produced. Also investigated are institutional arrange-
ments for accessing this information and the adoption of ICTs in government, which
contribute significantly to enhancing government transparency. To this end, this study
divides Korean governments into two periods: before and after democratization in the
late 1980s. Based on these analyses, the factors which influence improvements to 
governmental transparency and the implications for developing countries given the
experience of Korea will be presented. The primary information sources for this study
include a wealth of archival information, including white papers, newspaper articles,
and academic journal articles, as well as policy reports published by other concerned
authorities.
This paper is organized as follows. In section two, we review the theoretical back-
ground of transparency, including its definitions and constructs, the elements of trans-
parency policy measurements, and factors which influence the level of transparency.
In sections three and four, the author examines changes of government transparency
and the characteristics of policy to improve governmental transparency after democra-
tization in Korea. Finally, the authors conclude this paper with some evaluations and
policy implications for other developing countries.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Definition and Constructs of Governmental Transparency
Governmental transparency is defined as “the ability to find out what is going on
inside government” (Piotrowski and Ryzin, 2007). Similarly but with more of an
emphasis on information about government, it can be defined that “reliable, relevant
and timely information about the activities of government is available to the public”
(Kondo, 2002; 7). This type of the definition of governmental transparency focuses on
letting citizens know government operations and policymaking and giving them access
to a variety of information kept by the government such that the public can utilize
them. In the political realm, for example, transparency is identified as “enabling citizens
to learn what governments are up to through information provided by the government”
(Florini 1999).1 This approach emphasizes not merely opening up the information
itself but the opening of the overall operational processes, not only transparency in the
outcomes but transparency in processes and the organizations themselves as well
(Meijer 2009).
Governmental transparency in the context of freedom of information can be seen
as a basic human right. It is a basic need of people to acquire information from as many
sources as possible to expand their knowledge horizons and reveal their knowledge
through their personalities. Therefore, people should be able to determine their infor-
mation sources and the subject of the information on their own. From the perspective
of democratic governance, the history of democracy can be understood as a process of
struggling to earn information rights, or the right to be better informed. Democracy is
difficult to build without more information, reaching a state of being better informed,
and allowing public opinions to be built on the foundation. Moreover, governmental
transparency crosscuts many of the dimensions of democratic governance, such as
accountability, participation and representativeness (Piotrowski and Ryzin, 2007;
Birkinshaw 2006).
In the context of developing countries, transparency has been viewed as a key 
factor for building good governance. A higher level of governmental transparency is
also essential to economic development in developing countries: it improves resource
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1. In the cases of economics and finance area, it is defined very broadly as “a process by
which information about existing conditions, decisions and actions is made accessible, 
visible and understandable” (Working Group, 1998). In a similar context, transparency is
described as “the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social, and political
information” (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999).
allocation, enhances efficiency and increases the prospect of growth. Information
imperfections in markets increase transaction costs and give rise to market failures.
Though market failures hamper the working of all markets, they especially affect capital
markets (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999).
With empirical analysis on the relationship between transparency, national income
levels and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), Bellver and Kaufmann (2005)
show that countries that rank higher in wealth are also transparent,2 also show that
more transparent countries appear to be more competitive in the global market. More
specifically, taking the establishment of a business as an example of an administrative
procedure, they find that a greater degree of economic/institutional transparency is
associated with lower costs to register a business. According to their analysis on the
relationship between transparency and cost to register a business, in low transparent
countries more than 80 per cent of income per capita is needed to register a business,
compare to the 13 percent in countries with high levels of transparency on average.
In addition, enhancing transparency can effectively reduce corruption, as shown in
Figure 1 below, as well as other dysfunctions in government. It can make bureaucratic
corruption more risky and make it easier to provide good incentives to public officials
and the ease selection of honest and efficient individuals for public service. Transparency
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Figure 1. Control of Corruption and Political Transparency
Source: Bellver and Kaufmann (2005)
can also help reduce political corruption by increasing the overall level of public
accountability. Further, it can facilitate cooperative behavior instead of opportunistic
rent-seeking, helping to maintain norms of integrity and trust (Kolstad and Wiig,
2009).
From this perspective, government transparency has two types of constructs: infor-
mation and access (Park, 2001).3 The first construct of governmental transparency is
information. It consists of two elements: quantity and quality. Information quantity
refers to the amount and coverage of information disclosed by government. In terms of
quantity, transparent government should provide the following information in principle:
(1) all published materials or materials already in their possession, (2) all policies that
could be released publicly, (3) all information created or collected on a statutory basis,
(4) all documents that the public may be required to complete, and (5) corporate docu-
mentation in which the public would be interested (Hernon, 1998: 427; cited from
Park, 2001). The role of media, IT, and NGOs are important in expanding the range of
information available to citizens.
Information quality refers to the truthfulness, timeliness, and relevance of the infor-
mation provided (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999). Information should be of good
quality and reliable, timely, complete, fair, consistent and represented in clear and 
simple terms. Standards for quality must be ensured, possibly through verification by
external agencies or auditors or standards-setting organizations. Consistency with regard
to the use of processes to obtain information and in the formats of the information 
disseminated ensures comparability and so allows assessments of changes over time.
Dishonest reporting is deterred by the presence of various “watchdog” institutions
ranging from professional accountants or agencies, credit bureaus and Congressional
institutions, an independent press, stakeholder feedback, to even academic researchers.
The other construct of governmental transparency is access to information (Vish-
wanath and Kaufmann, 1999). It consists of the procedures, facilities, and methods
needed for increased convenience of information requests. Government information
should be available easily, widely, and equitably so that citizens can easily access and
grasp it. Laws and regulations ensure, at least in principle, that information remains
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2. The correlation between gross national income per capita in US dollars and the overall
transparency index is 0.72, which is in good agreement with earlier studies on governance
that found a positive correlation between institutional governance and cross-country 
differences in income per capita (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005).
3. The two constructs, information and access, are mutually dependent on each other to
improving transparency. In a certain respect, information is a substantial part of transparency,
while access is instrumental. Without true and relevant information, transparency cannot be
attained only by good access, and vice versa.
available to all. In part, this is aided by institutions and venues that facilitate its flow,
including media such as newspapers, radio, TV, public information notices, the Internet,
and word of mouth.
Policies to Improve Governmental Transparency
Based on the discussions of the definitions and the constructs of governmental
transparency, governmental transparency policies can be analyzed with institutional
arrangements and informational channels, which are associated with acquiring the cor-
rect information and facilitating the accessibility of the information kept by government
agencies.
First, building institutional arrangements related to governmental transparency is
especially important for improving transparency because such institutions can define
the authorities, accessibility levels and scopes of the openness of public information.
Moreover, they have an influence on the level of transparency by constraining actors
during policy processes, functioning as structural factors that influence the interactions
among them, and mediating the impact of information technologies and various 
environmental factors (Fountain, 2007; Snellen, 2005).
In particular, these institutional arrangements should be emphasized when discussing
governmental transparency considering the fact that a government in power has various
incentives to avoid the provision of information (Florini, 1999). The specific type of
information tends to cause governments to be reluctant to provide information, not
only to citizens but also even to public officials who belong to different public organi-
zations. This occurs because the disclosure of such information indicates a power shift
from the government to newly informed citizens and public officials (Park, 2001).
This is the very reason why more than 80 countries now enact some form of FOI laws
or regimes to define citizens’ right to know and their accessibility to public information
(Piotrowski, 2007). These types of laws and regulations give citizens the right to
access information from government agencies. Under these laws, agencies must disclose
any information that is requested—unless that information is protected from public
disclosure.
In addition to enacting FOI laws, innovative institutional reforms for strengthening
an enforcement system that promotes monitoring, improves accountability and punishes
offenders are required because transparency cannot be implemented effectively when
compliance is weak. Therefore, innovative regulatory reforms may be necessary,
devised through cooperation among government, the private sector, and civil society,
to encourage greater voluntary information disclosure and promote enforcement
(Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999).
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Second, implementing effective and efficient information channels is another 
significant element because it can influence the quality and quantity of the public
information that citizens can access as well as the time, scope and convenience of the
deliberation activities concerning public information. In this regard, one of the most
important factors for building information channels of public information is the adoption
of ICTs in public organizations (Bertot et al., 2010; von Waldenberg, 2004; Bhatnagar,
2003).
The adoption of ICTs has reduced the costs of transferring and evaluating infor-
mation, allowing for sophisticated and rapid dissemination of data and empirical
analysis while also increasing the quantity of the information dissemination. The
activity of e-government building has also contributed to enhancing governmental
transparency, especially through public information disclosures and the dissemination
of government information to the public.
More specifically, government information can be provided through the e-government
systems and web pages of government agencies for citizens to their offices, living
rooms and other places ubiquitously wherever they want, without requiring them to visit
a government agency, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, through non-stop operations
and one-click services. In addition, two-way communications through websites are
well-equipped on all e-government systems. Agencies in charge of e-government
operate cyber offices for civil applications in the Q&A and FAQ forms, as well as
other services in order to handle solicited feedback and suggestions and undertake
consultations, as illustrated in Table 1 (Kim et al., 2008; Song, 2004). ICTs can also be
adopted for providing information on the handling of internal business in central/local
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Table 1. Factors of Governmental Transparency through e-Government
Factor Means Examples
Expanding – Increasing participants – Increasing service providers and demanders
competition – Expanding time and space – Expanding service hours and offices
Reducing – Cutting facial contacts – Reducing office visits, permitting FAQs and 
discretion – Permitting appeals and petitions Q&A inquiries
– Introducing appeals procedures
Electronic – Innovating process – E-transactions for all processes
transaction – Reducing paperwork – Paperwork standardization practices
– Information sharing – Inter-agency information sharing
Information – Providing website services – Information disclosure through websites
openness – Disclosing civil applications – Providing ongoing civil applications on the 
Internet and e-government systems
Source: Song (2004: 109)
governments, which promotes better governmental transparency while also controlling
corruption (Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes 2010).
Influential Factors on Governmental Transparency with Emphasis 
on Democratic Factors
Different researchers have noted different factors which influence governmental
transparency. Several empirical studies have examined factors affecting governmental
transparency. Some scholars have focused on macro-factors of governmental trans-
parency. Hood (2006) attempts to answer these questions by combining the concepts of
action and structure and then reflecting the notions of “the power of particular interests,
i.e., power politics;” “reflecting widely distributed attitudes and beliefs, i.e., cultural
shift interpretations;” and “adaptations to prevailing technological and social conditions
for governments and many other types of organizations in the contemporary age, i.e.,
functional explanations.” With regard to these factors on cases of institutionalization
for improving transparency in Korea, Jung et al. (2012) consider the macro-factors of
democratization, globalization, and digitalization as driving forces to promote the
institutionalization of improved transparency.4
Cross-national comparative studies demonstrate that fiscal transparency in govern-
ment is highly correlated with following factors: corruption; democracy; development;
institutional quality such as government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of
corruption; political competition; inflation; and natural resources such as oil and ores
(Heuty & Carlitz, 2009; Andreula, Chong, & Guillén, 2009; Bastida & Benito, 2007).
Existing research mainly focuses on cross-national differences, but little is known
about the variation in governmental transparency of subnational and local governments
within specific countries (Ma, 2012).
Those who pay attention to factors external to government emphasize that the 
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4. More specifically, they argue that “democratization in Korea changed citizens’ values with
regard to the government’s degree of transparency and increased their call for transparency.
As a result, politicians have doubled their effort to respond to such calls. Globalization
spread policy ideas and brought in international pressures. For instance, Korea made an
effort to meet the global standards to join the OECD in 1995 and to respond to IMF’s call for
coercive isomorphism in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Advances in science
and technology, which can be also labeled as an ICT revolution, significantly contributed
to improving transparency in Korea as well. With the advent of the information society
came the development of the Internet and e-government, which drastically cut the costs of
accumulating, searching for, and distributing information and ultimately facilitated better
information disclosure” (Jung et al., 2012).
values and characteristics of democratic political systems, such as the pressure and
demand of citizens, enterprises, and their representatives, are crucial forces that push
government to provide open information (Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007). For example,
civil society groups also play a key role in pressuring the government to provide open
information and to enact FOI laws (Jung et al., 2012; Banisar, 2006). Citizen participatory
budgeting has been evaluated as effective for increasing the level of fiscal transparency,
as citizens are actively engaged in government budgeting reviews, pressure from
enterprises, particularly from those engaged in international trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI), also pull governments toward open administrative processes while
also facilitating their businesses (Ma, 2009).
The other external factor related to improving governmental transparency is the
power of the legislative branch in a democratized political system. “By resolution,
investigation, and the threat of even more punitive sanctions, Congress has repeatedly
asserted its belief that executive officials should not be allowed to withhold documents
and testimony at their own discretion (Rourke, 1960).” Legislative oversight has been
regarded as a robust mechanism institutionalized to checkmate the excesses of the
executive arm of government and government agencies to curb waste in governance,
corruption and absolutism in the exercise of political power, and to enhance governmental
transparency.
As an internal governmental factor concerning improvements to governmental
transparency, the roles and characteristics of highly ranked leadership have been
stressed. Particularly, strategic leadership theorists emphasize the importance of upper
echelons whose background characteristics largely explain strategic actions and the
performance of organizations (Ma and Wu, 2011; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Whether
the leaders acquiesce and provide support matters significantly for governmental
transparency. Evidence shows that city executives’ tenures in office and career back-
grounds explain a large part of the variation in environmental transparency (Lorentzen
et al., 2010).
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL 
TRANSPARENCY IN KOREA
Following the constructs and the indicators of governmental transparency presented
in the previous section, we examine the historical changes in governmental transparency
in Korea in this section. Specifically, we compare and contrast the levels of governmental
transparency before and after democratization with the following indicators: (1) the
quantity of government information, which can be measured with the number of presi-
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dential records in each administration; “watchdog” institutions inside and outside of
the executive branch, such as (2) the National Assembly and (3) the Board of Audit
and Inspection (BAI); (4) laws enacted to improve governmental transparency, such as
FOI laws; and (5) e-government services which contribute to improving governmental
transparency.5
Quantity of Government Information
The key characteristics of the Korean government before democratization in the
late 1980s have been regarded as state intervention in the market for economic devel-
opment and authoritarian integration based on an anti-communism approach (Cho,
2000). Korea maintained strongly state-centered relations with civil society after the
founding of the Republic. Its strong stateness was based on an over-developed state
apparatus which enacted coercive laws and a type of order that effectively controlled
civil society. In addition, there are various intermediate organizations that enhance the
capability of the state. This state dominance over civil society led to the deplorable
custom of putting government officials above people (Jung, 2005).
Under this authoritarian governance, a culture of secrecy was much more dominant
than that of transparency as a guiding value of public administration and policy. Of
course, values related to transparency, including the right to know, participation, and
freedom of information could not be realized under the string of strong authoritarian
governments at that time. The Korean Constitution does not have clauses that clearly
define people’s right to know. Governments strictly controlled access to public infor-
mation and only released information which was beneficial to maintaining the regimes
and to promoting mass mobilizations (Jang and Song, 2008; Im, 2008).
In this situation, the secrecy of the bureaucracy was strengthened in the top-down
and closed public administrative systems. Government bureaucracy monopolized public
information and had a tendency to handle in strict confidence even general information
which could be made freely available to the public (Park, 2008). For example, details on
corruption scandals in which public officials were engaged were handled as confidential.
Moreover, even information on government initiatives and programs which could
have had major influences on people’s daily lives, such as taxation policies, were kept
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5. Again, the two construct, information and access, are mutually dependent on each other for
enhancing transparency. In addition, each indicator presented above is clearly associated with
both information (quality and quantity) and access to improve governmental transparency.
This explains why the author analyzes the changes in governmental transparency with the
above indicators.
secret before their official announcement to the public (Ahn, 1987).
The culture of secrecy influenced the management of governmental records nega-
tively and was related to a low level of transparency. Records on public administration
and their preservation were simply perceived as a means of improving administrative
efficiency under the authoritarian regimes. The organization of the Korean National
Archives was founded in 1969, but the management of the records under the authori-
tarian regimes was mainly for the seamless dissemination and control of administrative
work attendant on the process of governing activities and for proof of outcomes of
administrative work, not for transparency or the people’s right to know (Yi, 2003); it is
not that the records were not created at all but that the presidents disposed of or took
out materials that could be used against them at the end of their terms (Jung et al.,
2012).
As illustrated in Table 2 below, there were fewer presidential records left by the
authoritarian regimes before 1988 than those left by democratic regimes after 1988,
even though the presidents’ years in office during the authoritarian regimes were longer
than those of the democratic regimes. In addition, the total number of presidential
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Table 2. Number of Presidential Records Left by Each Administration in Korea
Years Total Official Presidential Publications
President Tenure in number of documents Audiovisual Administrative Web and 
office official left documentation Data sets Record Booksrecords left
Rhee 1948-
Syngman 1960 12 82,340 17,254 65,068
Park 1961-
Chung-hee 1979 18 44,023 38,748 4,698 77
Chun 1980-
Doo-hwan 1988 8 44,872 36,631 7,713 31
Rho 1988-
Tae-woo 1993 5 32,085 30,817 904 14
Kim 1993-
Young-sam 1998 5 81,197 54,549 21,810 2,348
Kim 1998-
Dae-jung 2003 5 742,054 293,319 2,535 30,770 411,876 1,534
Roh 2003-
Moo-hyun 2008 5 7,553,358 1,167,175 732,440 658,640 4,971,158 20,359
Lee 2008-
Myung-bak 2013 5 10,879,864 1,028,953 1,407,352 3,298,129 5,134,137 7,797
Source: Homepage of National Archives of Korea (www.archives.go.kr) (Retrieved on April 13, 2014)
records left after each administration has drastically increased as democracy had been
consolidated. More specifically, only 5,609 official records were left per year during the
Chun administration, but 16,239 records were left during Kim Young-sam administra-
tion, 148,410 during the Kim Dae-jung administration, and 1,510,671 during the Roh
Moo-hyun administration. This considerable increase in the number of presidential
records, including official documents, can be interpreted as evidence of the enhancement
of governmental transparency.
Furthermore, various types of records began to be produced after democratization.
More specifically, numerous administrative data sets and presidential web records
have been produced since the Kim Dae-jung administration. These types of data
appear to have widened access to government information and enhanced the quality of
information that citizens can access, as different types of information and data can pro-
vide citizens with different types of tools with which to understand public administra-
tion and policies.
Institutions of the National Assembly Related to Improving 
Governmental Transparency
With democratization since the late 1980s, the National Assembly in Korea has
been granted more power to investigate government policies and administration. This
power shift to the National Assembly can be interpreted as proof that there have been
major improvements in governmental transparency regarding accessibility to information
as well as in the quantity and quality of information available to the public. There have
been several institutional changes to expand the role and power of this representative
institution, as discussed below (Jung, 2005; Park, 2000).
First, the institutional foundations upon which the National Assembly exerted 
control of the bureaucracy’s secretive manners in its undertaking of administrative
practices started to be strengthened with democratization. For example, the right of the
president to dissolve the Assembly was deleted by the ninth revision of the Constitu-
tion in 1987. In addition, the legislative branch’s authority to conduct administrative
inspections and investigations, which had been repealed 15 years earlier by the consti-
tutional referendum of 1972, was re-established in the revision in 1987 (Jung, 2005).
With this restored power, the National Assembly was able to oversee and scrutinize
the administrative practices more effectively, as shown in Table 3 below. Furthermore,
a U.S.-style independent counsel system was also introduced in 1999. The system of
an independent special counsel has been evaluated as having powerful effects on the
disclosure of information concealed by the government, and especially in clearing top
government officials of suspicion of being involved in a bribery scandal (Park, 2001).
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Second, the National Assembly Law, revised in 2000, provided that for the appoint-
ment of important positions in the executive branch, such as the Prime Minister and
Chairman of the BAI as well as the judicial branches, the president must obtain
approval from the National Assembly by holding a confirmation hearing. During the
process of these hearings, detailed information on the candidates’ careers, areas of
expertise, and capability to carry out the job required by the positions are disseminated
to the public. In addition, the law prescribes several other institutional arrangements,
whereby the Assembly can approve budgets more transparently, such as remaining in
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Assembly General Special Councils
1st 1948-1950 1 0 15 – 16
2nd 1950-1954 4 2 41 – 47
3rd 1954-1958 3 10 64 – 77
4th 1958-1960 2 1 14 – 17
5th(L/U) 1960-1961 1/1 1/1 11/5 – 13/7
6th 1963-1967 3 0 12 – 15
7th 1967-1971 4 5 8 – 17
8th 1971-1972 2 0 1 – 3
9th 1973-1979 0 – 0 – 0
10th 1979-1980 – – 0 – 0
11th 1981-1985 – – 0 – 0
12th 1985-1988 – – 0 – 0
13th 1988-1992 4 – 4 – 8
14th 1992-1996 4 – 4 – 8
15th 1996-2000 4 – 5 2 11
16th 2000-2004 4 – 3 3 10
17th 2004-2008 4 – 2 3 9
18th 2008-2012 4 – 3 3 10
19th 2012-Present 2 – 4 1 7
Source: Jung (2005); National Assembly (2008; 1988); Database on legislative information established
by the National Assembly
Note: L and U denote the Lower and Upper House, respectively.
session throughout the year (Jung, 2005). On the one hand, these institutionalization
processes, in this case the personnel hearings and process of budget approval in the
National Assembly, function as a mechanism or a venue that enhances government
transparency as well as an example that demonstrates how the National Assembly is
able now to place progressively more limitations on presidential power.
Third, several administrative apparatuses to assist the Assembly in enacting legisla-
tion, performing administrative oversight duties and scrutinizing finances, have been
institutionalized. The National Assembly Budget Office6 and the National Assembly
Research Service,7 which were modelled on the Congressional Budget Office and
Congressional Research Service of the U.S. Congress, have grown not only in terms
of the number of personnel, as shown in Figure 5, but also in the scope of their duty
and expertise (Kim and Park, 2009). Not only the National Assembly members, but
also the personnel of these apparatuses in the National Assembly have served as the
“watchdogs” of the workings of the executive branch while analyzing governmental
policy and administration and publishing their reports even to the public, which in turn
contributes to enhancing government transparency.
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Figure 2. Growth of the Number of Employees in Legislative Supporting Apparatuses
Source: Kim and Park (2009); Author’s calculation based on data from the decrees of each apparatuses
retrieved from the National Center for Legislation Information (www.law.go.kr)
6. As a fiscal institution to support the activities of the legislative body, founded in 2003
based on the National Assembly Act, the National Assembly Budget Office aims to enhance
the efficiency of the National Assembly by keeping the government in check and monitoring
its operation of national finances.
7. The major duty of the NARS, established in 2007 is to address requests from members or
committees of the National Assembly by undertaking research and analysis.
Activities of the Board of Audit and Inspection
In spite of the widespread secrecy of the administrative system during the authori-
tarian regimes, however, some administrative measures and procedures for collecting
and sharing government information were institutionalized at those times. The main
purposes of establishing these types of measures and procedures were not to realize
democratic values such as the right to know but to maintain the hold of power by the
bureaucracy in a top-down manner to achieve internal efficiency and effectiveness of
government policies.8 However, they resulted in contributing to the enhancement of
governmental transparency.
The establishment of the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) can be seen as an
example of such an enhancement.9 The major activities of the BAI since its establish-
ment have been audits and inspections. An audit refers to the activity of the verification
of the final accounts of the State, provincial governments and government-invested
organizations. Its results are reported to the president and to the National Assembly.
An inspection is an examination of the works of government agencies and the duties
of their employees (BAI, 2008). The number of agencies and government employees
that should be audited and inspected by the BAI has increased, as illustrated in Figure
3, as has the number of disciplinary actions and the number of employees subjected to
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8. In this regard, Ahn (1987) criticizes that the BAI was not fully autonomous from the external
pressure under the authoritarian regimes because the BAI strengthened the inspection and
audit activities in the years when then president paid attention to the corruptive behavior
and malfunctions of the public agencies and employees in public sector.
9. Very soon after the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, the Board of Audit was
founded under the president as the supreme audit institution pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of 1948, to carry out audits of the central government, local governments,
government-invested organizations, and other organizations as prescribed by law. The
Commission of Inspection was also established under the president in accordance with the
provisions of the Government Organization Act of 1948 to supervise and inspect the duties
of the employees of central and local governments, government-invested organizations,
and other organizations prescribed by law. The Commission was renamed the Commission
of Supervision and Control during the period of 1955 to 1960 and was then reorganized
under the Prime Minister with its original name, the Commission of Inspection, in accor-
dance with the Commission of Inspection Act of 1961. Audits by the Board of Audit and
inspections by the Commission of Inspection were in many cases so closely related that a
line could not be clearly distinguished between them. Taking this into account, the revised
Constitution of 1962 prescribed the merger of these two organizations into the current
Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI), which was established on March 20, 1963, under the
Board of Audit and Inspection Act of 1963 (BAI, 2008).
disciplinary actions by the BAI, as depicted in Figure 4. These activities contributed to
enhancing governmental transparency and anti-corruption efforts through their exami-
nations of the relevance and the purposefulness of the works of government agencies
and the lawfulness of the administrative actions taken by public employees.
In addition, the BAI has carried out the monitoring of whether public services were
successfully delivered to the service target groups. Since the 1980s, the BAI has con-
ducted performance evaluations of major government initiatives as well as evaluations
of these processes. The policy information produced through these activities of the
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Figure 3. The Number of Target Agencies and Employees of the BAI’s Audits and Inspections
Source: Ahn (1987) and Annual Report on Audits and Inspections (each year)
Figure 4. The Number of Disciplinary Actions and Employees Subject to Disciplinary 
Measures by the BAI
Source: Ahn (1987) and Annual Report on Audits and Inspections (each year)
BAI has been fed back to the policy formulation and implementation phases and used
for giving rewards and meting out penalties to the public officials linked to the initiatives
(Ahn, 1987; Rho, 1987).10 The establishment of the BAI and the institutionalization 
of the audits and inspections have been evaluated as beneficial as they make public
organizations and public servants more accountable and increase governmental trans-
parency (Park, 2008; Ahn, 1987).
Laws Enacted to Improve Government Transparency11
After democratization, enactment of the laws to guarantee accessibility to public
information and the adoption of ICT as a public information delivery channel were
simultaneously carried out. The Constitutional Court, which was installed in accordance
with the ninth amendment of the Constitution in 1987, put out a ruling that legally 
recognized the ‘right to know’ on a case regarding a request to peruse litigation records12
(Han 2002). In addition, more examples of institutionalization have been conducted
aggressively to define citizens’ accessibility to public information. These efforts have
enhanced governmental transparency, as illustrated in Table 4 (Jung et al., 2012; Yoon
2010).
More specifically, several major institutions which were enacted during this period
to improve governmental transparency have been considered. Examples are as follows:
(1) the Official Information Disclosure Act of 1996; (2) the Property Registration 
System for Public Officials of 1993; and (3) the Administrative Procedures Act in
1996. These acts commonly could not be enacted under the authoritarian regimes in
spite of the strong demand for their enactment from civil society. Details of these acts
are as follows.
First, the Official Information Disclosure Act was enacted in 1996. The Official
Information Disclosure Act (OIDA) prescribes people’s right to request access to
information kept and controlled by public institutions and the public institutions’
obligation to disclose such information. In detail, this law contains provisions which
ensure people’s right to know, requiring government agencies to make available any
written information in their possession. It has eight exemptions, including official
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10. The Office of the Prime Minister and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) conducted policy
evaluations which examined the monthly or annual progress of government programs from
the 1960s to the 1980s. These program evaluations had an impact similar to examinations
conducted by the BAI.
11. This part is based on Jung et al. (2012), co-authored by the author of this paper.
12. As decreed by the Constitutional Court on May 13, 1991 in the “90 Heonma 133 Decision”
secrets, privacy data, and information sensitive to commercial activities. It is also
tasked with building an open administrative system through oversight and criticism of
state affairs, and to securing public participation in state affairs and guaranteeing trust
in and the transparency of public administrations.
In addition, The Act provides channels and procedures through which to obtain
otherwise inaccessible information so that any citizen can make a request for any
record of a government agency, while it imposes a legal duty on the government to
disclose public information to citizens. Therefore, every public institution has an
obligation to disclose the information it keeps, and to be equipped with an information
management system necessary for disclosure under this law (Hong 2010, 179; Park,
2001).
Figure 5 below shows the trends of the requests for governmental information and
the rates of disclosure based on the FOIA. After the enactment of FOIA, the number
of requests for information held by government agencies increased from 25,475 in
1998 to 333,006 in 2012. The rate of disclosure, which includes the full and partial
disclosures of information requested by citizens, has fluctuated between 89.7% and
95.0% annually.
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Table 4. Laws and Measures for Enhancing Transparency Enacted after Democratization
Administrations Major laws and measures for enhancing transparency
– Emergency Decree for a Financial and Economic Executive Order on Real 
Kim Young-sam Name Financial Transactions and Guarantees of Secrecy
administration – Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election 
(1993-1998) Malpractices
– Political Fund Act
– Act on Disclosing Administrative Information by Public Institutions
– Anti-corruption Law
– Establishment of an anti-corruption commission
Kim Dae-jung – Measures to protect the act of whistle-blowing or whistle-blowers of 
administration corruption
(1998-2003) – Public right to request inspections, allowing the public to file a request for 
an inspection at the Board of Audit and Inspection
– Act on Confirmation Hearings
– National Integrity Committee
– Integrated an information system for anti-corruption
Roh Moo-hyun – Introduced an electronic information disclosure system
administration – Blind trust on stocks
(2003-2008) – Political Fund Act
– The Amnesty Act
– The Act on the Aggravated Punishment on Specific Crimes
Source: Jung et al. (2012) and Yoon (2010)
Second, the Property Registration System for Public Officials was enacted in 1993.
The Property Registration System for Public Officials (PRS) is intended to require
public officials above a certain grade level to register their personal property to prevent
misconduct and corruption. It is a part of the Public Service Ethics Act (PSEA) in
Korea, which was enacted and promulgated at the end of 1981. The PSEA states 
that high-ranking public officials, such as political appointees at the central and local
governments and the national assembly members, are required to register personal
property owned by themselves, their spouses and other immediate family members.
The law also contains clauses on reporting and registering property, reporting gift
items, and restrictions on employment for retired public officials. It is important to
note that this system signifies a fair degree of progress in terms of higher transparency
(Kim 2011, 22-34).
The PRS, discussions on which started in 1981, was implemented, albeit at a very
limited level, in 1983 because the administration in power at that time wanted to 
reinstate the legitimacy that was lacking due to the process through which the Chun
administration came to power and to keep at bay public antipathy with regard to the
many misconduct and corruption cases that occurred even after the inauguration of the
administration. However, the law had deficiencies in that registered items were not
subject to disclosure in principle and in that there were no rules on punishment given
the results of reviews—despite the fact that there were rules on review. In brief, the
administration simply created ‘symbolic uses of politics’ by agreeing that a very limited
form of property was subject to registration. Moreover, the registration itself was 
voluntary (Kim 2011, 17-19: Lee 1993).
Third, the Administrative Procedures Act was enacted in 1996 and revised in 2002.
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) aims at securing fairness, transparency, and
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Figure 5. The Number of Requests for Government Information and the Rates of Disclosure
Source: Ministry of Administration and Security. Annual Report of Government Information Disclosures
(Each Year).
trust in public administration and protecting people’s rights and interests by prescribing
common items concerning administrative procedures and promoting people’s partic-
ipation in public administration. Considered as one of the two pillars for realizing the
expansion of people’s rights and preferences and administrative democratization along
with the OIDA, the APA has significance as legislation which makes the transition
from a state-centric public administration to a participatory public administration
(Hong 2010, 3-4).
The APA contains various provisions to secure both transparency in public adminis-
trative processes and predictability of the outcomes. All requests made to administrative
institutions for processing must be in written form, and administrative institutions
must notify the person making the request what is necessary for the request or must
provide a handbook so that any person can have access. In addition, different adminis-
trative institutions must have a system they can commonly use for swift cooperation.
The processing time and criteria for processing results must be as detailed as possible
considering the nature of processing results concerned, and the people involved can
request an interpretation or explanation of the criteria for processing at a competent
institution if the disclosed criteria were not clear enough. In addition, if requestors are
imposed upon with obligations or their rights become restricted, notification must be
made in advance such that the requestors can defend themselves. In addition, the APA
presents the legal grounds for submitting opinions and for hearings (Hong 2010, 60-62;
Oh 1998).
E-Government, ICT-adoption for Governmental Transparency
After two decades of striving for informatization, Korea has earned the title as one
of the most advanced countries in terms of ICT. As shown in Table 5, the focus of
informatization shifted to unit-based or function-based processes such as those for
passports, patents and procurement administration in the 1990s with an emphasis on
the agency’s internal efficiency for public management. From 2000, it was about
building a government-wide infrastructure for e-government, for which 11 initiatives and
31 roadmap projects were implemented. With the launching e-government initiatives,
the Korean government paid attention not only to achieving administrative efficiency
but also to democracy, participation and transparency through the e-government. That
is to say, an e-government has been regarded as an “enabler” that promotes citizens’
participation in policy-making activities by disseminating government information to
the public and providing a means of two-way interactions between public officials and
citizens through the e-government system (NIA, 2011).
More specifically, e-government building has contributed to enhancing governmental
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transparency in Korea, especially through public information disclosures and govern-
ment information dissemination to the public. According to the results of the User
Take-up Survey of e-Government Service (NIA, 2013), 51.2% of citizens 16 to 74 of
age had used e-government services as of November, 2012. One of the main purposes
of the use of e-government services is to obtain information about government agencies
and policies. 53.2% of e-government users in Korea access the e-government systems
and homepages of government agencies for inquiries and to search for information
about government policies and administrative actions. In particular, this function is the
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Table 5. History of Korea’s e-Government Promotion
Phase Period Event Achievement
Computerization of an First and second phase of Administrative 1978-1987 Administrative System System Computerization Projects 
First (1978-1986)
Introduction
Construction of a National First and second phase of National 1987-1996 Backbone Network Backbone Construction Projects (1987-1996)
Foundation-building for a high-speed 
information and communications network 
(1995-2005)
Foundation 1996-2000 Informatization Promotion – Constructed an optical transmission Building network in 144 zones nationwide
Unit or function-based informatization
– Procurement, passports, patents, 
customs, etc.
Eleven initiative tasks for electronic civil 
Project 2001-2002 11 Initiatives for applications, e-procurement, etc.Initiation e-Government Partial and limited connection between 
unit tasks
Implemented 31 e-government roadmap 
31 Roadmap Projects for projects under the participation of multiple Growth 2003-2007 e-Government ministries (2003-2007)Amendment of the e-Government Act 
(Jan. 2007)
e-government promotion based on 
utilization and integration
Expansion of target organizations to 
Maturity 2008- Expansion of Integration administrative institutions, public offices, and Connection and some private-sector organizations
Unification of frameworks for national 
informatization and for the implementation 
of an e-government
Source: NIA (2011)
most popular service for those who are 16 to 19 and in their 20s.
Moreover, through information sharing and reducing the paperwork in conjunction
with business process reengineering activities, e-government systems can provide
transparent transactions between customers and public officials. For example, the
Home Tax Service (HTS) system, an e-government initiative in Korea in the field of
tax revenue, provides a nationwide service that permits taxpayers to pay taxes online,
thus restricting clandestine collusion and bargaining, while also providing various
types of public information about taxation in general as well as customer-oriented 
services (Song, 2004). Another good example is the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s
Online Procedures Enhancement system for civil applications (OPEN), which was
launched in 1999. Through OPEN, citizens can research the status of their materials
and gain information about related government officials online. The OPEN system itself
continually checks for delays in processing, and government officials and departments
must provide reasons for such delays. It is reported that the success of the system has
also dramatically changed the perceptions of the residents of Seoul about corruption,
with 68% crediting OPEN with noticeably reducing government corruption in its first
five years of operation (Cho and Choi, 2004).
In addition, ICT was adopted to support the effectiveness and increase the efficiency
of institutions to promote transparency. One of the examples of combining institution-
alized and ICT-enabled transparency is the public information disclosure system on the
Internet (www.open.go.kr) based on OIDA. Any person who intends to make a request
for information may access the web page of the system and submit an electronic
request for such information through the system. The requests through the Internet are
delivered automatically to the staff members of the agencies which maintain the infor-
mation. If the applicant for the information disclosure wants to receive the information
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Figure 6. Portion of Requests though the Internet and Disclosures in Electronic File Formats
Source: Ministry of Administration and Security. Annual Report of Government Information Disclosure
(Each Year)
in an electronic file format, this is also possible. As shown in Figure 6 below, online
applicants accounted for 69% of all applications as of 2011 (with mail at 4%; fax at 5%,
and in-person at 22%). Information disclosures in an electronic file format accounted
for 54% of the total as of 2011. This online public information disclosure system has
been evaluated as saving time and reducing the costs incurred in implementing FOIA
institutions (Ministry of Administration and Security, 2012).
FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPROVED GOVERNMENTAL 
TRANSPARENCY IN KOREA
This leads to the question of what factors influence the adoption of policies to
improve governmental transparency in Korea. As previous research has pointed out,
democratization acts as the most important macro-level causal factor. With the democ-
ratic transition in 1987 followed by its consolidation, Korean people began to demand
more in terms of their right to know government administrative actions and public
policies.
Under the democratized political environment, active civic engagement for more
transparency has been given greater consideration and has received political support
from the public as a policy agenda item (Jung et al., 2012). Major civic groups13 have
served as central advocates and built supporting coalitions for the movement to improve
transparency by means of various activities, including filing legislative petitions, opening
a civil counseling center, holding public hearings, and supporting academic research on
the legislations and institutions. Even after the enactments and the institutionalization
activities, they have monitored recurring problems with the acts, supervised whether
the acts were implemented as they stipulated, and, an act should require revision, filed
petitions and engaged in civil counseling to make the revisions possible (Jung et al.,
2012; Eom and Heo, 2011).14
In addition, democratization has made the National Assembly stronger and more
autonomous than before (Park, 2000). The constitution revised after democratization
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13. The major civic groups which played central roles in the course of enacting laws and insti-
tutionalizations for improving transparency are as follows: the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice (CCEJ) and academic associations such as the Korean Public Law Associ-
ation (KPLA) in the case of the APA and the OIDA, the People’s Solidarity of Participatory
Democracy (PSPD) in the case of the Property Registration System for Public Officials,
and the KPLA and the Korean BAR Association in the case of the APA.
14. Refer to Jung et al. (2012) for detailed information about the civic engagements in the
course of the institutionalization process for improving transparency.
in the Sixth Republic bestowed the National Assembly with a stronger position; the
president cannot dissolve the National Assembly, there is no limit to the total number
of days in session, and the National Assembly has the power to inspect all aspects of
executive operations during every annual regular session. In addition, the relationship
between ruling and opposition parties changed after democratization with the results
of elections. For example, since the transition to democracy, there has often been a
minority government with opposition parties holding a majority in the National
Assembly. Political parties usually have strong internal integration and unity, and this
makes the legislative decision-making process a form of party government. This type
of “divided government” generates the opportunity to develop a ‘politics of coalition
building’ among multiple parties. All of these factors have contributed to giving the
National Assembly increased power while also restraining the executive branch. The
National Assembly in the democratic era has become more assertive, independent, and
vigorous than kit was in the authoritarian past. The increased power of the National
Assembly has contributed to enhancing governmental transparency, carrying out the
functions of a watchdog over the executive branch.
Under democratization, presidents who have the background of a ‘fighter for
democracy’ and their political parties have regarded transparency as an important
value for democracy and administrative reform. Consequently, they have pledged to
introduce measures and institutions that enhance government transparency, such as the
OIDA, the APA, the ‘Anti-corruption Law,’ the ‘Real Name Financial Transaction
System’ and other measures. In the course of developing their presidential election
pledges, they received policy proposals from NGOs who strongly argue against the
institutionalization of transparency. After taking office, presidents have attempted to
fulfill their election pledges with regard to governmental transparency. Presidents
acted as entrepreneurial politicians who fought at times against powerful existing
stakeholders. It was this type of presidential leadership that decisively supported those
examples of institutionalization to enhance governmental transparency.
Also, as competition over elections grew fierce with democratization, for example,
with the democratic opening of the Sixth Republic, the percentage of the first-term
legislative members in the Thirteenth Assembly increased again to fifty-five percent.
It was reduced to forty-one percent for the Fourteenth Assembly, showed a slight
increase for the present Fifteenth Assembly (forty-six percent), and then decreased to
forty-one percent again for the Sixteenth Assembly (Park, 2000). This higher level of
competition in elections has been an advantage for politicians as they respond to such
demands for reforms by the public, or for their constituents, for their own electoral
success, leading to the enactment of laws and regulations to enhance governmental
transparency. After all, changes in macro-level politicalenvironments, specifically
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democratization and changes in values held by the public, pursuing public and personal
interests by politicians and members of civic social communities alike, have cooperated
and worked positively towards improved transparency.
Finally, executive dominance, one of the major enduring characteristics of Korean
public administration since the era of the authoritarian regimes, has been one of the
major factors influencing the governmental transparency. In fact, it was not the
National Assembly or civic groups but the public officials in the executive branch who
were in control of the game of improving governmental transparency, even under
democratization. Essentially, bureaucrats strongly opposed the enactment of the APA
and OIDA, arguing the potential for drastic increases of administrative burdens and
costs.15 They tried to narrow the scope of the application of the acts and to employ
diverse exceptional clauses. In addition, career civil servants steeped in administrative
expediency were at the center of the advocacy coalition against such policies. The
OIDA bill was withheld at the second vice-ministerial meeting due to the divergent
opinions between agencies (Eom and Heo, 2011; Kim 2000, 176; Ministry of General
Affairs, 1997: 39).
This resistance of the bureaucrats had a regressive effect on the bills (Hong, 2008).
For example, the enactment of citizens’ right to engage in active participation in the
administrative process failed in the APA. In addition, provisions on information not 
to be made available to the public were prescribed in a comprehensive manner in 
the OIDA. This led to problems in the implementation of the OIDA, such as public
officials’ arbitrary decisions to refuse reasonable requests for public information and
improper denials by government agencies (Park, 2001).
CONCLUSION
It was not until the democratic transition of 1987 that the transparency of the 
government began to improve in Korea. Under the authoritarian regimes, secrecy was
emphasized for governing over transparency. Some administrative measures, such as
audit and inspection activities of the BAI, can be evaluated as having contributing to
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15. They made a case that from the perspective of public administrators who must become
more responsive, the legislation of administrative procedures practically amounted to 
giving up flexibility in public administration. Another concern raised by them was that the
enactment of the APA would make it difficult to process administrative work normally
when the demand for administrative processing was growing at an exponential rate (Kim,
S.S. 2003).
enhancing governmental transparency in this era, although they had clear limitations.
The key characteristic of the transparency policy after democratization was the pursuit
of the simultaneous progress of institutionalized and ICT-enabled governmental trans-
parency. On the one hand, citizens’ accessibility to and the disclosure of public infor-
mation were institutionalized. On the other hand, ICTs enable citizens to access such
information more efficiently through non-stop operations and one-click services. The
ICT systems and the Internet function as an efficient channel for delivering public
information for improving transparency. In the course of establishing the institutions to
improve governmental transparency, however, executive dominance and bureaucrats’
resistance to governmental transparency were the major challenges.
What are the policy implications for developing countries from the Korean case?
First, building e-government systems is one of the most critical steps to making more
information available. Certainly, ICT capabilities for supporting public information
disclosures will result in a high level of governmental transparency while also reducing
the costs and level of inconvenience felt by citizens. However, policymakers in 
developing countries should consider the fact that different countries have different
capabilities and different institutional and cultural backgrounds for successful ICT
adoptions in the public sector. In this vein, careful evaluations of existing information
systems and ICT capabilities in the public sector should be carried out while modifying
successful cases for enhancing government transparency in other countries.
Second, rigorous institutional arrangements with regard to governmental trans-
parency should be built. The enactment of legal frameworks and regulations can be
the first step for achieving a more transparent government, as institutions can define
the authorities, levels of accessibility, and the scopes of openness of public information.
However, the Korean cases point out that extensive and holistic institutional reform
will be necessary over piecemeal reforms. The enactment of only FOI laws is not 
sufficient (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005). Rather, other types of laws which regulate
different dimensions of transparency, including openness of administrative procedures,
controlling corruption by public officials and politicians, the effectiveness of public
informational resource management, and so on, should be enacted. Furthermore, in
order to enhance the effectiveness and the efficiency of the implementation of policies
for fostering government transparency, these institutions should be supported by various
policy tools, including e-government systems (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009).
Third, government efforts for improving transparency should be incorporated with
the powers of civil society (Mudacumura, 2014; Park, 2001; Vishwanath and Kaufmann,
1999). There are more systematic ways for civic groups to be empowered and to solicit
voices in the course of improving governmental transparency. For example, regular
surveys of government transparency of civic activists can be carried out. In addition,
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members of civic groups can participate in the decision-making process. These mea-
sures are expected to play an important role as an outside monitoring system. In sum,
extensive institutional reforms for enhancing government transparency incorporated
with civic group participation and ICT adoption will contribute to furthering government
transparency and openness in developing countries.
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